Thursday, January 29, 2009
The Job Search: An Expert's Advice
Monday, January 26, 2009
The Tax Canon -- Andrews '72 (Part 1)
When Andrews retired from Harvard in 2007, former student Edward McCaffery said "There is much to admire about Bill’s scholarship, but what I best know and love Bill from are three articles published in the Harvard Law Review, in 1972, 1974 and 1975—known to cognoscenti simply as Andrews 72, 74 and 75." [Note that I'll be coming back to Andrews '74 in awhile as it is also included in the tax canon.]
For a peek at the substance of the 72 article, McCaffery goes on to say:
Much of income tax theory in the 20th century was dominated by theSo that's what we can look forward to: another very important work from another very important guy. If I seem less than excited, it may be because this article is substantially longer than the previous ones. On the up-side, if the most difficult math consists of I = C + S then this should be a cake-walk compared to Mirrlees '71.
so-called Haig-Simons definition of income, which holds essentially that Income
equals Consumption plus Savings (I = C + S)—that all money or wealth (income) is
either spent (consumption) or not (savings). Many have written about the income
side of that equation: the importance of finding and taxing “all income, from
whatever source derived.” The simple genius of Bill Andrews was to look to the
right-hand, or uses side. What we are taxing—in an income tax—is consumption
plus savings. This change of perspective effected a Copernican revolution in our
thinking about tax. Andrews 72 pointed out that, while the arguments for source
neutrality are compelling, those for use neutrality are far less so—just maybe,
“we” do not want to tax all consumption, like medical expenses or charitable
contributions, equally.
Saturday, January 24, 2009
The Tax Canon -- Mirrlees '71 (Part 2)
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
Real Estate Depreciation
When I started this blog, I determined that I would refrain from commenting on current and proposed tax policy because I'm just a student and really don't know what I'm talking about. There's really nothing much more unbearable than reading through a know-nothing's pontifications on the state of the universe. However, I've got two cents burning a hole in my pocket, so I'm going to throw 'em in. [I'll try to keep this from becoming a habit.]
Today's post by Professor James Maule on his MauledAgain blog discusses a proposal, articulated in a 2007 post by Robert Flach on his Wandering Tax Pro blog, to end the IRC's allowance of real estate depreciation deductions. From every angle this makes good economic sense; the deduction may have helped contribute to the overinflation of the housing market, and there is no reason to allow a deduction on an asset that is in fact appreciating in value. However, after realizing what a good idea discontinuing the deduction would be, one realizes the political impossibility of doing away with it.
My first thought was that if we can't outright do away with real estate depreciation we must be able to find away to counteract its effect. My second thought was to toughen the recapture rules -- perhaps by upping the tax paid on recapture -- and giving the option to depreciate as much (up to a point) or as little as the taxpayer thinks is economically accurate with the threat of penalties if they are found to have deducted too much when they eventually sell the property. My third thought was that this is a dumb idea (for a number of reasons that I won't waste your time by enumerating).
So here is my current thought: why not continue to allow taxpayers to profit from the fiction that their real property depreciates in value so long as there is no evidence to the contrary? The catch would be that a property value assessment for local property tax purposes would count as evidence to the contrary. If a tax assessment showed that a taxpayer had claimed too much in depreciation deductions since the purchase or previous assessment, then the service could either 1. require taxes on recapture to be paid immediately, or 2. require the rate of depreciation be adjusted match the current trend as evidenced by the change in value since the property's purchase or previous tax assessment. Certainly there are quite a few issues to work out before attempting to implement such a policy (and I won't waste your time by typing out my current list), but I cannot think of any that would be an outright deal-breaker.
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
Gotta Get a Job
After my morning walk and bowl of kibble, I perused my daily slew of websites and blogs. Of particular note -- aside from much about the inauguration of our new president -- was a post on Paul Caron's TaxProf Blog about the poor state of academia and professordom and such. The second section was an excerpt from a Forbes article describing the experience of law student couple who graduated with a ton of student loan debt and ended up getting divorced partially because of the financial strain.
This isn't really a new story, but I was still thinking about it a few minutes later in the shower -- it probably stuck with me because the students graduated from a law school just down the street -- when a horrible realization struck: I am those students. When I graduate in a year and a half, both I and Mrs. Goose will be paying off loans of a similar magnitude as those discussed in the excerpt. Plus I have the added responsibility/expense of a puppy of my own on the way. The couple in the article apparently had six-figure jobs and still had troubles, so my non-plan of just assuming that whatever job I take after school will be adequate suddenly seems extremely foolish. So the big realization is that I need to get serious about setting up gainful employment in 18 months or so.
To that end, I'll plan on chronicling here my endeavors to learn about the job market, how best to promote oneself, and any other tidbits and adventures that may come along. Perhaps my inevitable mistakes will prove useful to someone out there.
Monday, January 19, 2009
The Tax Canon -- Mirrlees '71 (Part 1)
I have heard the name Mirrlees a number of times, but I did not until now know anything about him or his work. (This is officially the part of the blog post where I admit to now feeling stupid.) Apparently Professor Mirrlees won a Swedish prize of some sort in 1996 -- other than that he's not so notable. (This is probably where I first heard of him.)
It seems that Professor Mirrlees is an economist's economist -- the sort of brilliant person who made me realize that my efforts in grad school were pointless, thus causing me to leave with a lowly MA. He's the sort who seems to enjoy complex mathematics for its own sake, and ends up shedding light on some of mankind's more pressing problems merely by happy happenstance. Reading his mini-autobiography, one learns that Professor Mirrlees has exuded brilliance (though he would not make such an immodest claim) since boyhood, and continues to work for the simple pleasure of it. His many publications are phenomenol in their breadth as well as their complexity (so it seems to me anyway) and I hope to have the chance to read some of it in the future. (Actually, if I want to learn anything about optimal tax theory, I will have no choice but to read many Mirrlees papers.)
Most interestingly, much commentary about Professor Mirrlees' work on optimal taxation points out how much it is at odds with what most of us assume must be attributes of an efficient and effective tax system. I'll save a breakdown for my later post about his '71 paper, but suffice it to say that it is officially gee whiz stuff.
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
Apparently Tax Professors Do Actual Work
Anyhow, I thank Professor Maule for this post as I am sure that I am not the only law student who found it illuminating.
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
Oops
And now I'll go and sort out my list of articles to this doesn't happen again.
The Tax Canon -- Surrey '70
It was my intention to find a pretty picture to accompany this post similar to that seen below in part 1 of my Bittker '67 post. Unfortunately, Stanley Surrey does not seem to be as prolific as the authors of the previous two articles; the best I was able to come up with is a list of a few of his books and articles, a rant deriding his policies on the taxation of overseas income, recognition that there is currently a Stanley S. Surrey Professor of Law at Harvard, and recognition in a Washington State Institute of Public Policy article that "The idea of identifying and measuring tax exemptions is often attributed to Stanley Surrey". The best source of Stanley Surrey biographical information came from a footnote on the first page of the article itself: "The paper itself says: Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.S., College of the City of New York, 1929; LL.B., Columbia, 1932. Professor Surrey was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy from 1961 until 1969." Sounds impressive, and I'm surprised not to have easily found more information -- or at least a photo.
The paper can be pretty well summed up by its own summary (duh):"The tax code contains a great number of special provisions which provide credits, deductions, and other tax advantages intended to achieve non-tax goals considered desirable by Congress... Professor Surrey argues that the tax incentive is generally inferior to the direct subsidy as a means of achieving social goals: that incentives are usually less equitable, since they benefit persons in high tax brackets most, and more difficult to develop and administer, since they are handled by tax committees and administrative agencies which have little expertise in non-tax social policy. He suggests a strong presumption against their use."
Much like Bittker '67, this article spends most of its time tearing down previous statements of others. Surrey presents a number of reasons generally given in favor of using the tax code as a tool of social policy (most of which seem facially pretty weak anyway) and then explains why they are flawed at best and idiotic/corrupt at worst. In most cases, the use of the income tax to bring about policy goals is counterproductive because of the progressive nature of the tax code (deductions are worth more to the rich than the poor), distortionary effects on economic activity, and because lost revenues are often in excess of the value of the change that is sought. Surrey concedes that there may be a way to design a tax incentive such that its negative effects would not be greater than those of a direct transfer program, but in such a case we would be relying on tax experts to administer social policy. It would be much better to allow the tax folks to run the tax system and the social policy folks to administer social programs.
For once I didn't feel particulary dumb while reading this article, but I did realize that I have never fully considered the purpose of income phaseouts of some tax benefits. I guess I had assumed that income phaseouts for such programs were just a means of minimizing revenue loss when in fact they are also probably in place to avoid giving the rich a larger benefit than the poor and thus directing the bulk of the program's resources on those who don't need the program to begin with.
Ok, one more down and quite a few more to go. Next time let's read J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971).
Saturday, January 10, 2009
My Fancy New (Actually Used) Tax Book
Friday, January 9, 2009
New Zealand Tax Factoids
Thursday, January 8, 2009
The Tax Canon -- Bittker '67 (Part 2)
Stepping through many aspects of the tax code -- from the various exclusions from gross income, personal and business deductions (and the fuzzy frontier between the two), timing and accounting principles, and the basis for taxation of individual income itself -- professor Bittker describes the consequences that would necessarily follow implementation of CTB principles and often ends up with a ridiculous scenereo that would make one embarassed to have ever said, "hey, we should have a comprehensive tax base." In most cases the crux of the argument is that exclusions and deductions in their current form serve legitimate purposes, and while they may be imperfect, removing them wholesale would result in drastic, counterproductive, and unjust consequences. He basically accuses CTB advocates of being shortsighted and failing to think before they speak.
As for how this article made me feel stupid: I had to look up two non-tax terms that I had not before encountered. Arguendo and rara avis, meaning "for the sake of argument" and "a rare person/thing" respectively, have not previously shown up on my radar though they both seem like useful terms (which I am sure to notice everywhere now) that one would expect to show up fairly often. Ah well yet again.
Note: Clearly I am opting for short blurbs about these articles; I can't tell if this is because it is truly preferable or if I am just too lazy to go back through many pages of notes to talk about specifics that interested me. If article #3 turns out to produce a short and fluffy blog post, then I suppose that will just have to be the norm. By the way, article #3 will be Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970). Now there's something to look forward to.
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
The Tax Canon -- Bittker '67 (Part 1)
I have now spent about an hour reading about Boris Bittker, the author of the next stop in my journey through the tax canon entitled A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967). Professor Bittker died in 2005, and the outpouring of fond memories from members of the community of tax scholars is a testament to the massive impact that his work had on the field. (One can read a number of dedications and memories here and here.) Though tax was the primary focus of Bittker's career, he also made large contributions to constitutional law and the question of slavery reparations. Based on the glowing reviews that I have come across, I hope to one day read some of his non-tax work.
And now for what is becoming my standard admission of idiocy: it seems that if one has heard of only one tax professor, then one should have heard of Boris Bittker. I have heard of a few tax professors -- even one or two who didn't teach me tax -- but have not heard of Boris Bittker until now. It seems I am starting this study of tax law for the bottom of a well of ignorance. Ah well.
On last note about the '67 article: in his dedication to the memory of Professor Bittker, Professor John Simon says of "the quest for a 'comprehensive tax base'... Boris thought
it to be a mirage". So we can look forward to hearing all about how the idea of a comprehensive tax base is a load of nonsense.
Monday, January 5, 2009
My Fave Five
The Tax Canon -- Blum & Kalven '52
So what do these guys have to say about The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation? A whole lot, and the case that they make is indeed uneasy at best. The article begins by defining a progressive tax as "...one whose rate increases as the income of the taxpayer increases; under it a taxpayer with ten times the total income of another would pay something more than ten times as much tax." and then stating that the purpose of their essay is to answer the question, "On what grounds is a progressive tax on income to be preferred to a proportionate tax on income?" Beginning with the notion that it just makes intuitive sense to most of us that those who are rich should pay more in taxes (as a proportion of their income) than should the poor, they move through a number of frameworks with which to analyze the validity of our collective hunch that a progressive tax is just and desirable.
Under the (quite believable) assumption of diminishing marginal utility, Blum and Kalven discuss at length the various ways in which we might seek to tax individuals according to the utility that they would be forced to give up and/or their ability and relative willingness to pay the taxes needed by the state. What is truly fascinating is that no matter what economic logic is applied to the case of progressive taxation, the best that the authors are able to show is that a progressive tax is not worse than a proportional tax. I was expecting a mathematical proof that a progressive tax should be strictly preferred to a proportional tax, but apparently there is not one available -- and certainly not for lack of trying as the authors frame the progressive tax in a number of clever ways that I certainly would have never thought of.
Something that struck me while reading this paper was a sudden realization of my own idiocy. I have always thought that of course the rich should be taxed more heavily as the loss of utility that stems from losing a single monetary unit is always going to be less for someone with more money than for someone with less. What I never considered was the next logical step that the authors point out: if we are going to tax based on marginal utility lost as defined by a utility function uniformly applied to every individual, then we will need to tax the richest individual at 100% for any amount in excess of the income (or wealth) of the second richest individual, and then tax them both at 100% for all amounts in excess of the third richest individual, and so on until we have raised the required revenue or everyone has the exact same wealth. Well duh. Clearly this is not something we would advocate outside of socialism, but it never crossed my mind as the logical consequence of my cursory thoughts about taxation. So if there's one thing I have learned it is that my brain isn't good for much beyond chasing sheep.
Further hand-wavey attempts are made to justify a progressive tax on the philosophical basis of equality. As one might expect, there are plenty of arguments in favor of greater equality within a society, but there are an even greater number of problems with any particular mechanism of bringing about greater equality; such is the case with a progressive tax as the vehicle for social harmony. As in the more economics-focused arguments, there is no knock-out reason that progressivity should be viewed as a good thing, but there is no reason to believe otherwise either.
In the end, as the authors point out, the reader is left only with his original general feeling that a progressive tax is probably a good thing. No proof has been given to back up this feeling, but at least there has been no solid contradictory evidence either. Overall it seems like a progressive tax is the direction that society ought to go in (or already has gone in, even long before the article was conceived) but because there is no way to measure the benefit of progressivity, there is no known way to design a progressive tax so as to maximize its effectiveness and minimize its costs.
Now look at that, I've read a whole tax paper. I've only scratched the surface of my notes -- I will have to debate whether or not to go into greater detail the next time around or just keep it light and fluffy. Next up: Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967).